لراوبر ویب پاڼه لراوبر يو افغان – تازه خبرونه
From the Archives:
Bruce G. Richardson
Farkhar Incident
On 24 December 1989, Sayed Jamal, a senior commander of Hekmatyar’s party, his brother, and two prominent officers were hanged for a crime they did not commit. They stood accused of ambushing thirty-six men, including seven commanders of Massoud’s Shura-i-Nizar in Tangi Farkhar, (Yousaf p. 129)
An official of the Ambassadorial Foreign Ministry Section in Kabul who spoke on condition of anonymity, told Afghan journalist Sayed Noorulhaq Husseini and myself during an interview that the attack was orchestrated by Massoud himself for political and tactical-advantage reasons and that five or six had been killed, not thirty-six as originally reported: (Ambassador (Libya) Naim Ajmal, Kabul, 11/2/97)
‘We have a saying that speaks to this matter. Massoud hit three targets with one bullet. In the first instance, Massoud wanted to discredit Hekmatyar; especially after his successful OIC conference in which he attended as Foreign Minister, and so he blamed him for ordering the attack. Second, he wanted to be rid of Qazi Islamuddin, a Jamiat commander who opposed his Shura-i-Nizar party, and third he wanted to eliminate Sayed Jamal, who shared power with him in Taloqan. I know two people who witnessed the attack, but I cannot name names for fear of retribution. So you see Massoud hit three targets with one bullet.’
In the wake of the bloodbath, Hekmatyar insisted that an independent investigation into the matter be initiated. “This is a fight between two commanders, we should not go to war with Jamiat over this,” he said. He also demanded the names of the entire group of thirty-six alleged to have been killed.
At a meeting in Takhar, and just prior to his assassination, an angry Jamiat commander, Qazi Islamuddin, strongly stated his opposition to Massoud over the formation of Shura-i-Nizar, ‘Why do we need two parties, one party is enough, is it just to make Massoud a big shot?’ As the meeting concluded, Qazi Islamuddin was cautioned by other attendees that he was in imminent danger…soon the weight of those prophetic words would resonate throughout Afghanistan. ..En route from that fateful meeting, Qazi Islamuddin was attacked and killed by assailants of his own party. (Husseini)
Noted Afghan combat-journalist veteran, Sayed Noorlulhaq Husseini attended a press conference in Peshawar during the latter part of 1986. At the conference, Jamiat officials proclaimed the formation of Shura-i-Nizar, under which they announced ‘would be a broad-based organization of mutual benefit to all Mujahideen’. The ambiance and attendant statements were obviously choreographed for the benefit and consumption of and by the foreign press-corps in attendance. Husseini aggressively queried officials as to whether or not new party members could retain their original party affiliations. Afghan journalists-questions and concerns about party priorities and policy were routinely ignored. Husseini asserts that Jamiat officials were clearly solicitous of the foreign press-corps in attendance.
Dr. Alexandre Fedotov, Chief, Ukraine’s Security Services (SBU), successor to the Ukrainian KGB: opined that ‘the formation of Shura-i-Nizar was inspired by Moscow ostensibly to counter opposition to Massoud’s political ascendancy, and his concessions to the Soviets from other Jamiat members. (Fedotov)
When Afghan veteran combat journalist Sayed Noorulhaq Husseini and Bruce G. Richardson queried Khalqi Defense Minister Shah Nawaz Tanai, during an interview in Rawalpindi, 12 November 1997, about the Farkhar incident, he expressed surprise to us that we had knowledge of the affair. He said that there were ‘five people killed’, and that in his opinion based on sources he would not name, ‘The attack was by Massoud’s hand.’ Shah Nawaz Tanai stated also that ‘Massoud was assisted by the Samad, and Koor-i-Mali militias of Najib to locate and arrest Sayed Jamal.’ (Translation by Combat Journalist Sayed Noorulhaq Husseini)
Hekmatyar’s demands were unceremoniously ignored by Massoud who had released only the names of five victims. The resultant media frenzy over the Farkhar incident, combined with the Western media’s openly unabashed contempt for Hekmatyar, indelibly diminished the persona of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in the eyes of the world. Thus Massoud, through treachery and choreographed-disinformation, turned the Government of Sibghatullah Mojadidi against his Foreign minister (Hekmatyar) and in so doing rendered the government dysfunctional as well. In the wake of the Massoud putsch, the Mujahideen became hopelessly fractionalized, and each in his own way contributed to an element of anarchy that would prevail until the advent of the Taliban. This is not, however, an isolated incident. The elimination of competing commanders and those aspiring to positions of leadership were often unceremoniously eliminated by Ahmad Shah Massoud. (See: Dr. Nabi Misdaq, Dr. M.Siddieq Noorzoy, Eric S. Margolis, Alexandre. A. Liakhovskii, S.E. Gregor’ev, General Boris Gromov, Leonid Shebarshin, and Soviet Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) for support documentation and corroboration as cited in the Note Section below)
On page 196 of his internationally-acclaimed book American Raj, Liberation or Domination, Resolving the Conflict between the West and the Muslim World, veteran war correspondent and investigative author, Eric S. Margolis writes:
‘While pretending to fight the Soviets, Massoud actually devoted his mail efforts to combatting the Pashtun Mujahideen thwarting their efforts, backed by Pakistani intelligence agents, to blow-up the strategic choke point of Soviet logistics…the Salang Tunnel.’
‘During the ten-year Jihad against the Soviets, the Tajik military leader Ahmad Shah Massoud was lionized in the West as a heroic anti-Communist mountain warrior…the “lion of the Panjshir. In reality, he had long collaborated with the Soviet KGB, a fact recently revealed in the memoirs of retired Soviet intelligence officers from KGB and GRU military intelligence.’
Corroborative Source Notes:
Ajmal, M. Naim, Former Afghan Ambassador to Libya. An interview with Bruce G. Richardson, 11 November 1997, Translator: Noted Afghan Combat Journalist, Sayed Noorulhaq Husseini, Peshawar.
Fedotov, Alexandre, Professor of Asian and African History, Former member CPSU, former Advisor to Presidents’ Leonid Kravchuk and Kuchma, Ukraine, currently, employed as Chief, Ukraine Intelligence Service, (SBU). The SBU is the successor Agency to the KGB. An Interview with Bruce G. Richardson, 2 November 1992.
Fedotov, Alexandre, Ibid, ‘Personal correspondence and interview with Bruce G. Richardson. Fedotov, “I know the name of the KGB officer who took money to Ahmad Shah Massoud, Colonel Zakin Kadyrov,” 2 November 1992.
Gregor’ev, S.E., ‘The Pandhzher from 1975-1990: Moscow, 1997, p.40, translation by Professor Ian Helfant, Chief, Department of Slavic Languages and literature, Harvard University.
Gromov, Boris V, Commanding General, Soviet 40th Army, Afghanistan: author of ‘Limited Contingent’, Moscow, 1994, pp. 188-197.
Husseini, Sayed Noorulhaq, Noted Veteran Combat Journalist of Afghan Information and Documentation Centre (AIDC), Peshawar, an interview with Bruce G. Richardson: ‘In 1985, in the Salang, I saw Massoud’s people riding on the tank with the Shuravi. They were laughing and joking together. Sometimes Massoud and the Shuravi would attack other Mujahideen’. Peshawar, 10 November 1986.
Liakhovskii A.A., Soviet General, Historian, Author ‘Plamya Afgana’, Moscow, 1999. pp. 485-86, 630-674, translated for ‘Cold War in History’ Project, (CWIHP) Washington, D.C., by specialist Gary Goldberg.
Main Intelligence Directorate: (MID) of the General Headquarters, USSR Armed Forces, Moscow. Title: ‘The Lion of the Panjsher’, Article No. 18, (No. 882/83-3-S-77. Fond: 80, Perechen 14, Document 77, 1991). Translation: excerpts by Elena Kretova, Information Services, Moscow.
Margolis, Eric S, Noted Historic Author and Veteran Combat Journalist,’ The ‘American Raj, Liberation or Domination: Resolving the Conflict between the West and the Muslim World,’ 2008, p. 196.
Misdaq, Nabi, Dr., Historian and Author, See: his highly-rated ‘Afghanistan, Political Frailty and External Interference’, 2006, p. 162.
Noorzoy, M. Siddieq, Dr., Historian and Author, See: His All-Powerful book, an unequaled, Historic Document Collection and historical prize in one massive volume: ‘Communications by Members of the Afghan Diaspora about Events in Afghanistan to US Leaders, the UN and World Leaders September 21, 1979-October 7, 2013, 2013’.
Shebarshin, Leonid, Retired Director, First Department KGB (Foreign Intelligence), ‘The Hand of Moscow’, Moscow, 1992, pp. 177-214.
Tanai, Shah Nawaz, Khalqi Defense Minister, ‘An interview’ with Bruce G. Richardson, Shah Nawaz Tanai, and Sayed Noorulhaq Husseini, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, 12 November, 1997. Translation conducted by noted Combat Journalist, Sayed Noorulhaq Husseini representing AIDC, Afghan Information and Documentation Centre, Peshawar.
Yousaf, Mohammad, and Mark Adkin, Authors,’ The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story’, London, 1992.
Portions of the preceding text published previously in: Afghanistan, Ending the Reign of Soviet Terror, Bruce G. Richardson, 1996, 1998, pp. 73, 74.
Bruce G. Richardson
