لراوبر ویب پاڼه لراوبر يو افغان – تازه خبرونه
There exists a latent or residual curiosity among a number of Afghans, though reluctantly and or inexplicably unexplored by credentialed Western authors of repute, as to the where and when of the late [*] Ahmad Shah Massoud’s initial contact with the Soviet Intelligence apparatus. Amongst a loyalist legion of Western authors and academicians, Ahmad Shah Massoud remains for all-time; the fabled ‘Lion of the Panjshir’, who’s storied wartime exploits rival those legendary warriors featured in Ernest Hemingway’s epic guerrilla (1940) saga, For Whom the Bell Tolls which pits volunteer American professor Robert Jordan in solidarity with the Spanish Loyalists against Franco’s Fascist forces in the Spanish Civil War.
The foregoing background information surrounding Ahmad Shah Massoud’s relationship and attendant time line with Soviet Intelligence is gleaned from published accounts by internationally accredited and acclaimed war correspondent Eric S. Margolis, the respective memoirs of Leonid Shebarshin and Oleg Kalugin, ranking former First Department (Foreign Intelligence) KGB officers with Afghanistan experience. Translation of the respective Soviet journals was performed by Professor Ian Helfant, Department of Slavic Languages and Literature, Harvard University.
Though exposed to Marxist-Leninist thought as a student at the Soviet built and staffed Polytechnic Institute, it is now believed that Ahmad Shah Massoud’s initial contact with the Russian Secret Services took place in Lebanon during the latter portion of the 1970s. (1)
Following his failed conspiracy and armed rebellion (1973-1975) against Daoud, Massoud went into emigration (Egypt, Libya and Lebanon), actively participating in military and terrorist operations as a member of Palestine military groups. While in Libya, Massoud underwent guerrilla and sabotage training at Soviet training facilities. Relevant, corroborating and supporting documentation can be found in The Soldier’s Story, an acclaimed, historic account of the Soviet/Afghan War by authors’ Heinamaa, Lepanen and Yurchenko, (1994, pp. 113-115) which provides the researcher with invaluable, direct testimony as provided the authors by Ivan Shumelyov, a conscripted, apolitical Russian soldier who served in Afghanistan. Excerpts follow. (1, 2)
Ivan Shumelyov:
‘Before the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan our company worked with the 201st Division’s area, which was situated near Samangan and Baghlan, Ahmad Shah Massoud was the commander of the guerrilla troops in that area. He had studied at the Moscow Military Academy at the same time as General Varennikov. It was said that when Varennikov celebrated his birthday, Ahmad Shah went to visit him and took presents.’
‘There were two pipelines beside the road leading from the Soviet Union to Kabul. Diesel oil was carried along one and kerosene along the other. We agreed with Massoud’s guerrillas that we would guard the pipes in the easy terrain and they would guard them in the mountains. We paid them several tons of flour and a container of fuel a month.’ (1, 2)
From American Raj, Liberation or Domination, Resolving the Conflict between the West and the Muslim World, 2008, p.196, highly-acclaimed, syndicated columnist and author Eric S. Margolis writes:
‘During the ten-year Jihad against the Soviets, the Tajik military leader Ahmad Shah Massoud was lionized in the West as a heroic anti-Communist mountain warrior…’’The Lion of the Panjshir’’. In reality, he had long secretly collaborated with the Soviet KGB, a fact recently revealed in the memoirs of retired Soviet intelligence officers from KGB and GRU military intelligence.’ (1, 2)
At that juncture in Cold War history, a variety of militant groups became subordinate to and under KGB control. According to Oleg Kalugin, former Major General, KGB Foreign Counter-Intelligence, ‘the KGB had close ties with Palestinian and other terrorist and separatist groups in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Africa, Pakistan and elsewhere.’ Arms, cash and military advisers were routinely provided to the various guerrilla organizations displaying Marxist orientation. Among their ranks were KGB agents and advisers who facilitated every detail of command and control of operations. So complete was KGB penetration of Palestinian militant groups that ‘strong ties’ were even forged with Chairman Yassir Arafat. (3)
Assassinations and kidnappings were routine operations for the KGB control groups. Recruitment of ‘assets’ (agents) for future use was also a common occurrence among Afghan and Palestinian groups. (4) Nothing of a politico-military nature occurred in Lebanon at that time without the knowledge and prior-approval of KGB case-officers. In KGB parlance these operations were known as ‘active measures.’
Though the fateful decision to invade Afghanistan had not as yet been taken, (3/1979), deliberations as well as contingency plans were under constant evaluation and discussion by Moscow during this time frame. (5, 9)
In October of 1987, Yuri Korbert was assigned to the General Staff as a razvedchick or scout, as part of a Spetznaz reconnaissance brigade in Afghanistan. In his own words:
‘Our mission was to provide timely intelligence to members of the General Staff as to the military situation on the ground in Panjshir and adjacent areas that were under the control of Ahmad Shah Massoud. At the time we had negotiated an armistice with Ahmad Shah which in effect provided for the safe transit of Soviet convoys along Highway #2 from Hairatan to Kabul, and prohibited ISA (Massoud’s) detachments from directing combat operations against Soviet troops at their respective posts. For our part, we delivered food, medicine and ammunition to Ahmad Shah. On several occasions while delivering supplies to his base I had the opportunity to meet with Ahmad Shah and to discuss issues of importance to him.’
‘Massoud, he was more like a businessman than a fighter. He often told me that he was only interested in mining the stones and if we left him alone, he would not touch us. He refused to allow Russian soldiers to photograph him in their presence, he said it was for religious reasons, but I think it was that his cooperation with us was to be kept secret. During my six-months in the Panjshir zone our military observed the truce and did not initiate combat operations against Ahmad Shah’s detachments. Ahmad Shah honored his commitments and rigidly observed the ceasefire.’
‘Often times, the RA leadership, against the advice of the Soviet Command would attempt to instigate the 40th Army into combat operations against Massoud, but when those plans were undertaken our generals would alert Massoud that an operation was imminent, planned for an armed incursion into Panjshir and he would fade away into the mountainside valleys with his people out of harm’s way. At the end of operations he would move back into the valley.’ (6)
According to KGB published accounts: (Oleg Kalugin), Massoud, while in emigration (1970s) and as a political tour de force, was at that time a non-entity…a virtual unknown on the world stage. However, what commanded the attention of the KGB was multi-faceted. First, was the fact that here was an Afghan émigré’ amongst the ranks of Arab militants, second was Massoud’s predisposition to work with foreign intelligence services and his alleged ties to the ISI during the planning of the abortive coup against Daoud, but perhaps most important was his professed political and ideological orientation and acute obsession with leftist/Communist revolutionaries…Che Guervara, Mao, and Fidel Castro among others. (9)
Bruce G. Richardson
Notes:
(1) The Hand of Moscow, Leonid Shebarshin, Progress Press, 1992, pp. 177-214,
(2) The Soldier’s Story, Heinamaa, Lepanen and Yurchenko, 1994, pp. 113-115**
(3) Ibid**,
(4) American Raj, Liberation or Domination, Resolving the Conflict between the West and the Muslim World, Eric S. Margolis, 2008, p. 196.
(5) The First Directorate, My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West, Oleg Kalugin, ST. Martin’s Press, 1994, pp. 164-165.**
(6) Ibid**
(7) The ‘Bulletin’, Cold War in History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., Fall 1994, pp. 75-76.
(8) Personal interview with Soviet veteran of the war in Afghanistan, Yuri Korbert and the author, 28 November, 2005.
(9) That a Soviet strategy existed designed to weaken Afghan resistance whereby the northern provinces of Afghanistan would be severed and incorporated into the Soviet Central Asian mosaic has been thoroughly documented. The Soviet assigned names of these additions were to be “Greater Tajikistan, Greater Uzbekistan, etc., etc. See: Afghanistan, A Search for Truth, Bruce G. Richardson, 2009, pp. 31-32, 59-71, 76-78, 81-89, 125-137, 131-136, 275-276
(10) Moscow’s plan for the dismemberment of Afghanistan was endorsed by Ahmad Shah Massoud who during the long ten-years of war aspired to be Moscow’s chosen or appointed leader of the new fledgling Central Asian Republics. Details of this Soviet plan to re-configure Afghanistan, a plan supported by Shura-i-Nizar, was a topic of discussion during an interview with former Prime Minister Hassan Sharq, broadcast on Ariana TV from Kabul on August 4 and 6, 2013, (9)
Two assassins with explosive-laden cameras are alleged by Western (US) Intelligence to have been complicit in Ahmad Shah Massoud’s death as a result of and directed by the issuance of a fatwa by Osama bin Laden… today, facts widely disputed and as yet unsubstantiated.
In addition, there exists eyewitness testimony to contradict the official (US) story-line. Masood Khalili informed the Indian press during an interview on 6/2007), ‘that a missile’s tell-tale signature; super-heated gasses emanating from the missile’s engine exhaust and thrust into the cooler atmosphere as a result of and during ignition, resulted in a vapor-trail observed approaching the building just prior to the explosion.’
Noteworthy as well, is that the alleged assassins security clearance, meeting and audience with Massoud, had been vetted and pre- approved by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. A fact that portends that an internal power-struggle cannot be ruled out and that a resultant coup was in force and the motivation behind the assassination.
[**] Translation of Russian language texts by Professor Ian Helfant: Department of Slavic Languages and Literature, Harvard University. Russian language titles/publications as cited above are available from Eastview Press, Minneapolis, MN. Portions of the foregoing text previously published in Afghanistan, a ‘Search for Truth’, Bruce G. Richardson, Free-Forum Press, 2009, pp. 31-32.
