لراوبر ویب پاڼه لراوبر يو افغان – تازه خبرونه
Afghans must fear the outcome of Istanbul Conference. The conference did end with a non-binding declaration that all regional countries will respect Afghanistan’s sovereignty, its territorial integrity and independence and that they will cooperate to remove “safe havens”. But only words of a declaration mean nothing on the ground: no mechanism, and no contact group for monitoring if the pledge is not respected.
Now as this piece argues, a case for the strategic involvement of international community particularly the US in post 2014, has never been clearer: (in the run up to Loya Jirga scheduled for this month in Kabul) for Afghans this means the last hope in post 2014 is to have the US strategic bases in Afghanistan to prevent ambitious neighbours like Pakistan imposing their own vision of post 2014 peace settlement at the cost of what they have achieved over the last ten years.
The Istanbul Conference was perhaps the last attempt by the US and NATO allies including Turkey to see if any regional agreement is possible on Afghanistan. The Turkey Conference attempted to ensure a new security arrangement on the pattern of OSCE for Europe to monitor confidence building measures on Afghanistan by regional countries. But Islamabad is believed to have shot the proposal for any binding mechanism in the conference with the tacit support of Iran and China in particular. Islamabad reportedly insisted that there is no need to have a new mechanism as there already exists Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
However, existing platform as suggested by Pakistan-OSC- ensures the supremacy of China and Russian in the Central Asia including Afghanistan. China and Russian’s interests may not necessarily align with the interests of Afghans in the post 2014 scenario: how?
As far China is concerned, it is already in agreement with Pakistan that Afghanistan is the strategic influence area and hence Pakistan should have the dominating role in what should happen in Afghanistan post 2014. Besides, China\’s record on Afghanistan is dismal: it has effectively sublet Afghan policy to its ally (Pakistan) in the past as well. It hates any unrest in its Sinkian province by Islamic militants from Tribal areas but it is comfortable to see Islamabad sending militants into Afghanistan, notwithstanding its ambitious investment plans for the exploitation of minerals and oil in Afghanistan. China believes that Pakistan-Sino friendly relations mean its interest in Afghanistan is safe if Islamabad succeeds to establish its proxy-the Taliban. Thus it has adopted a backstage in the on-going flurry of diplomatic activities allowing Pakistan to be at the centre stage in the region.
Russian has over riding goe-political interest vis-a -vis its “ near- abroad” area of influence, i.e., the Central Asia. The Central Asian states are landlocked and they need access to Gulf and South Asia and Europe through Afghanistan. With part of Afghanistan in the grip of insurgency, it may continue to prefer Central Asian states’ reliance on Russia. For Russia, the world to have any access to Central Asian resources should go through Moscow. Thus by default it has enjoyed dividends of instable Afghanistan over the last two decades. In other words, Afghanistan becoming a new corridor for Central Asia in post 2014 may not cater to its immediate interest when the oil prices are high and it is sitting on stash of cash accrued from its rich reserves.
Iran being a regional power has somehow succeeded in influencing events in Iraq: after the fall of Saddam Husain, Iraq has effectively come under the strategic influence of Iran. The US has decided to pull all its remaining troops from Iraq after failing to strike strategic agreement with Iraqi government under the pressure of pro-Iranian elements in the Parliament and the government. As a result Saudi Arabia and to a degree Turkey has lost significant leverage in Iraq. Saudi Arabia having lost in Iraq to Iran may want to back its proxy -possibly neo-Taliban among the ranks of Afghan Taliban to balance Iran in Afghanistan. Thus Iran Saudi-rivalry over Iraq may play out in Afghanistan once again in post 2014.
But the elephant in the room is Pakistan: Islamabad is not prepared to see India to have any strategic influence in Afghanistan. The strategic agreement between India and Afghanistan, and its plan to lay ground for a nearly 900 km train service between Bamiyan and Chahbahar port have only rattled policy makers in Islamabad. The rivalry between India and Pakistan has already been playing out in Afghanistan even when there are more than 150,000 American and NATO troops present in Afghanistan: example of attack on Indian embassy in Kabul is a case in point. One can imagine this rivalry will touch new heights in the post 2014 Afghanistan if the US totally withdraws.
Pakistan believes that it is winning in Afghanistan and that the US has lost any leverage to put pressure on Pakistan to bring insurgency to a close. Its attitude seems to be “hold the US pressure till 2014 and get on driving seat once the last soldier of the US and NATO forces leave Afghanistan”. The triumphant Islamabad still remembers how the US was harping on Pakistan-US realignment on Afghanistan in the very recent past when Ambassador Holbrook was incharge of Af-Pak policy. The near rapture of Islamabad-Washington relations recently convinced policy makers even more that they are holding the trump card on Afghanistan: the Haqqani network.
Recently, Pakistan has achieved what it could only dream of in the last couple of years:
through the Haqqani network, it created the invincibility of the insurgency in the mind of the US and NATO policy makers: “you can not defeat insurgents unless you give them what they want-complete dominance of Afghanistan”. It forced the Afghans to feel intimidated and harassed by the Taliban in process reviving the bad memories of the killing fields in wake of resisting the Taliban in the past. It also succeeded to send some Afghans edgy and adopt defensive positions vis- a- vis the Taliban\’s renewed vigour thus undermining the stability of the Karzai Government. The Haqqanis\’ attacks also firmly re-established in the eyes of the US that Islamabad is seeking a monopoly over what to negotiate and with whom.
Turkey\’s conference was last ditch effort to diplomatically weaken Pakistan’s leverage and resulting \”exuberance\” on Afghanistan: to form regional mechanism with contact group to monitor claims of neighbouring countries particularly Pakistan that it respects Afghanistan sovereignty, and territorial integrity. But it failed.
Unfortunately, for Pakistan there are no Afghan red lines in post 2014. Afghans want to see guarantees from reconcilable Taliban that they will publicly severe relations with Al Qaeda, respect women rights, human rights, minorities’ rights and elections for any government, underpinned by Afghanistan\’s current constitution.
But Islamabad’s vision is different: it wants to see the proxy Taliban at the helms to ensure \”friendly government\” in Afghanistan in post 2014. Protagonists of broader regional agreement on Afghanistan would have learnt in Turkey that it is simply not possible to give what regional powers (like Pakistan) want in Afghanistan.
Thus given the geo-political manoeuvrings of Pakistan in Afghanistan, the Islamabad-Delhi rivalry, the potential negative fallout of Saudi Arabian- Iran rivalry over Iraq and Bahrain, China’s effective sponsorship of Islamabad’s dominating role in the region over Afghanistan, in order for Afghans to stop the “little game” of the regional heavy weights like Pakistan is to have continued strategic engagement with the international community particularly the United States. Hence the only chance to ensure territorial integrity and independence of Afghanistan in practice is to have the US strategic bases in Afghanistan.
Or else, the price for Pakistan\’s version of peace reconciliation and eventual regional rivalry gaining strategic leverage in Afghanistan is to give up Afghan “red lines”. Now it is up to Afghans to weigh the price: give up red lines or accept the US bases in post 2014 Afghanistan- the choice is plain and simple.
